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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 55 2010 NUMBER 5
Issues In The Third Circuit
AMENDMENT 706 TO THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
NOT ALL IT WAS CRACKED UP TO BE
I. INTRODUCTION
It may seem draconian, but not very long ago someone caught with a
teaspoon of crack cocaine could receive the same mandatory five-year
prison sentence as a person caught with two cups of powder cocaine. Af-
ter receiving complaints from multiple organizations, the United States
Sentencing Commission sought to correct this unwarranted disparity and,
on November 1, 2007, passed Amendment 706 (the Amendment), which
modified the base offense levels applicable to crack cocaine offenses. 2 On
March 3, 2008, the Sentencing Commission declared the Amendment ret-
roactive.3 In so doing, the Commission opened the door to an estimated
19,500 prisoners who could seek reduced sentences. 4 Nevertheless, while
this Amendment prompted thousands of prisoners to seek resentencing,
1. See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING
REFORM: A MODEST STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 1 (2007) [hereinafter CRACK
COCAINE SENTENCING REFORM: A MODEST STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION], http://
www.famm.org/Repository/Files/Handout forretroactivity-vote_2_%5B1 %5D.
pdf (explaining why U.S. Sentencing Commission decided to reduce guideline
range); see also Harlan J. Protass, Crack Sentencing Is Wack: But a Fix May Finally Be on
the Way, SLATE (Sept. 28, 2007, 1:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2174860/ (de-
tailing disparity that exists between length of sentences for crack cocaine and pow-
der cocaine).
2. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, Amendment 706 (Nov. 1,
2007) (amending base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses). See also JANET
HINTON, CRACK RETROACTIVITY AMENDMENT CASE LAw 1 (2009), http://www.fd.
org/pdf_1ib/Hinton%20crack%20update%208_09%20revision 2.pdf (listing date
Amendment first took effect).
3. See id. at 1 (listing date that Sentencing Commission made Amendment
retroactive).
4. See Memorandum from Glenn Schmitt et al., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, to
Hon. Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 1, 5-6 (Oct. 3, 2007),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/ImpactAnalysis- 2 00 7 1003_3b.pdf (esti-
mating number of potential offenders who would be eligible to seek reduced sen-
tence); see also CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING REFORM: A MODEST STEP IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that according to Commission's analysis
19,500 prisoners over course of thirty years could be affected).
(959)
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current data suggests that one-third of such motions have been denied for
a variety of reasons including: (1) the offense did not involve crack co-
caine; (2) the offense was not eligible under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 (the Com-
mission's policy statement); (3) the motion was denied on the merits; or
(4) the court provided no explicit reason.5
In United States v. Jane Doe,6 the Third Circuit denied a motion for
resentencing filed byJohn and Jane Doe, who were subject to a mandatory
minimum sentence but received a downward departure because of their
substantial assistance to the government.7 The court relied on an earlier
Third Circuit case that involved a downward departure from a mandatory
minimum sentence, United States v. Cordero,8 to help guide its analysis of
the resentencing statute.9 The majority relied heavily on Cordero in deter-
mining that the defendants' offenses were not eligible under the policy
statement.'o Notably, the majority's reasoning differed from the approach
used by other circuits, such as the Second Circuit's approach in United
States v. McGee.31 In McGee, the court made a point to avoid undermining
the purpose of the Amendment by reading the resentencing statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2), formalistically. 1 2
5. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY CRACK COCAINE RETROACTIVITY
DATA REPORT 1, 4 (2009) (identifying percentage of motions that have been
granted and denied by district courts as of November 17, 2009). It is important to
note that this data could change as the Sentencing Commission receives more in-
formation. See id. at 3 (explaining that these figures only represent cases that have
been decided and reported to Sentencing Commission as of November 17, 2009).
Specifically, there still are numerous judicial districts that have motions that are
being challenged and reviewed. See id. (cautioning that there are currently mo-
tions that are being reviewed or awaiting review). Depending on the outcome of
these motions, the percentages of denied motions could be higher or lower than
the current figures. See id. (explaining that these numbers will change based on
cases decided and reported after report was created). Nevertheless, of the 23,155
motions that have been filed in the district courts, 15,359 have been granted and
7,796 have been denied. See id. at 4 (listing geographical distribution of outcomes
for sentencing reconsideration subsequent to crack cocaine Amendment).
6. 564 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2009).
7. See id. at 315 (concluding that Amendment did not lower appellant's
mandatory minimum sentences and, therefore, failed to satisfy second element of
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2)).
8. 313 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2002).
9. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 311 (stating that "although Cordero addresses the appro-
priate starting point for a downward departure rather than the interpretation of§ 3582(c) (2)," Cordero is still instructive).
10. See id. at 316 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (suggesting that Cordero addresses
different stage of sentencing than substantial departure motions and, therefore,
might not be applicable).
11. See United States v. McGee, 553 F.3d 225, 230 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that
individual designated as career offender, but ultimately sentenced based on initial
guidelines, should be eligible for resentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
12. See id. at 229-30 (pointing out that, contrary to Amendment's intent, de-
fendants in instant case were clearly sentenced pursuant to crack cocaine guide-
lines and disadvantaged by 100-to-1 ratio).
960
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This Casebrief analyzes the class of individuals affected by the Third
Circuit's ruling in Doe and compares the court's reasoning with the ratio-
nales advanced by other circuits.' 3 Part II addresses the necessity for the
Amendment and the issues that the circuit courts have encountered when
applying it in conjunction with the resentencing statute.' 4 Part III dis-
cusses the factual background of Doe and the Third Circuit's analysis.' 5
Part IV analyzes Doe's future impact on litigants in the Third Circuit and
contrasts the court's reasoning with other circuits.1 6 Part V concludes by
suggesting that the Sentencing Commission should issue a clarification to
the Amendment to help ensure that the purpose that motivated its enact-
ment does not get lost in translation.17
II. APPLYING AMENDMENT 706: THE CIRCUITS AGREE TO DISAGREE
A. Retroactive Amendments: Power to Change the Past
The Sentencing Commission is given authority to make amendments
to the sentencing guidelines pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o).18 In addi-
tion, 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) provides that the Sentencing Commission retains
the authority to determine whether a sentencing reduction should be ap-
plied retroactively.19 After an amendment is made retroactive, qualified
prisoners are allowed to file motions for reduced sentences pursuant to
the resentencing statute, which has two main requirements: (1) a court
cannot modify a term of imprisonment unless the term was "based on" a
13. For a discussion of Doe's impact on crack cocaine litigation and the indi-
viduals affected, see infra notes 124-45 and accompanying text.
14. For a historical analysis of recent crack cocaine litigation since the
Amendment's enactment in 2007, see infra notes 36-78 and accompanying text.
15. For the factual background of Doe, see infra notes 79-93 and accompany-
ing text.
16. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's opinion in Doe, see infra notes 94-123
and accompanying text.
17. For an explanation of the unusual outcomes that can result from the
Third Circuit's holding and a call to the Sentencing Commission to provide
greater clarification, see infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006) (giving authority to Sentencing Commission
to make amendments to guidelines).
19. See id. § 994(u) (giving Sentencing Commission authority to lower sen-
tencing ranges and to determine whether reduction should be applied retroac-
tively). Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) states that "[i]f the Commission reduces
the term of imprisonment recommended in the guidelines applicable to a particu-
lar offense or category of offenses, it shall specify in what circumstances and by
what amount the sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the
offense may be reduced." See id. (requiring Sentencing Commission to specify how
prisoners' sentences will be affected any time it reduces guidelines applicable to
particular offenses or categories of offenses). Interestingly, the Sentencing Com-
mission did not come into existence until 1984 when Congress created it in the
Sentencing Reform Act. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLIcY 1, 4 (1995) [hereinafter Co-
CAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 1995], available at http://www.ussc.gov/
crack/execsum.pdf (explaining Sentencing Commission's origin).
9612010] C:ASEBRIEF
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sentencing range that has been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o); and (2) the court may grant a
reduction only after considering the list of factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
and ascertaining whether the reduction is consistent with the applicable
policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission.20
As noted, the second prong of the resentencing statute requires that
any reduction be consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy
statement.2 1 This policy statement is found in the United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines and has important exclusions and limitations that can af-
fect a defendant's ability to satisfy the second prong. 22 As a prerequisite,
the policy statement mandates that an amendment must be listed as a cov-
ered amendment in subsection (c) of the statement in order to be eligible
for modification.23 Only listed amendments may be applied retroac-
tively. 24 The policy statement also provides courts with guidance as to the
amount of reduction that should be allowed for prisoners seeking a sen-
tence modification. 25 It also instructs that if the other requirements of the
resentencing statute are met, the judge should consider the factors listed
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2) (2006) (listing requirements judges are man-
dated to meet if they modify term of imprisonment).
21. See id. (requiring that reduction is consistent with policy statement of Sen-
tencing Commission).
22. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(b)(2) (2008) (listing
exclusions and limitations that apply to reductions of terms of imprisonment).
23. See id. § 1B1.10(a) (2) (requiring that amendment incorporated in subsec-
tion (c) be consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statement).
24. See id. § IB1.10(c) (listing amendments that Sentencing Commission de-
cided to include in policy statement). Currently, the covered amendments are:
126, 130, 156, 176, 269, 329, 341, 371, 379, 380, 433, 454, 461, 484, 488, 490, 499,
505, 506, 516, 591, 599, 606, 657, 702, 706 as amended by 711, and 715. See id.
(reciting amendments covered by policy statement). Arguably, the Commission's
policy statement approach is its way of acknowledging that a reduced sentence is
sufficient to achieve the prior goals of sentencing. See Schmitt et al., supra note 4,
at 3 (stating that inclusion of Amendment in policy statement reflects Sentencing
Commission's policy determination that reduced guideline ranges are sufficient to
achieve purposes of sentencing and may be appropriate for previously qualified
defendants). The policy statement does acknowledge that determining a reduced
guideline sentencing range should be applied retroactively, but does not: (1) af-
fect the legitimacy of a previously imposed sentence; (2) affect any other compo-
nent of a prisoner's sentence; or (3) entitle a prisoner to a reduction as a matter of
right. See id. (qualifying implications of Amendment being listed in policy
statement).
25. See U.S. SENTENCINc GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(b)(1) (providing
courts with guidance as to how they should determine appropriate reduction of
previous sentences). The Manual states:
In determining whether, and to what extent, a reduction in the defen-
dant's term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2) and this pol-
icy statement is warranted, the court shall determine the amended
guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the
amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) had been in ef-
fect at the time the defendant was sentenced . . ..
Id.
962
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 5 [2010], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss5/1
2010] CASEBRIEF 963
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) before deciding whether to modify the term of
imprisonment. 26
B. Rewriting the Rules
The crack cocaine disparity began with the enactment of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986.27 At that time, crack was a relatively new drug
and Congress feared that it was far more dangerous than powder co-
caine.28 Nevertheless, as more information about crack cocaine became
available, the Sentencing Commission started to believe that the punish-
ments being issued in connection with crack cocaine offenses were too
harsh and recommended that Congress revisit the sentencing guide-
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006) (requiringjudge to consider factors of Sec-
tion 3553(a) to extent applicable before reducing term of imprisonment). These
factors are required when the judge is deciding whether to reduce the term of
imprisonment because the Sentencing Commission has lowered the sentencing
guidelines and applied them retroactively. See id. § 3582(c) (2) ("[1I]n the case of a
defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentenc-
ing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . .
the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set
forth in [S]ection 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable. ). Terms of
imprisonment may be modified in other ways such as:
[I]n any case-
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of proba-
tion of supervised release with or without the conditions that does not
exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they
are applicable, if it finds that-
(i)extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or
(ii)the defendant is at least 70 years of age ... and that such a reduction
is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission; and
(B) the court may modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the ex-
tent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure ....
Id. § 3582(c) (1) (listing other ways to modify terms of imprisonment).
27. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). The stated purpose of the Act
was
to strengthen Federal efforts to encourage foreign cooperation in eradi-
cating illicit drug crops and in halting international drug traffic, to im-
prove enforcement of Federal drug laws and enhance interdiction of
illicit drug shipments, to provide strong Federal leadership in establish-
ing effective drug abuse prevention and education programs, to expand
Federal support for drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation efforts, and
for other purposes.
Id. (explaining original purpose of Act).
28. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 567 (2007) (outlining rea-
sons why Congress found it necessary to create significantly higher penalties for
crack cocaine as compared to powder cocaine). The end result was that an indi-
vidual with fifty grams of crack would be punished the same as someone who was
found with five thousand grams of powder cocaine. See id. (giving example of dis-
parity between amounts of crack cocaine and powder cocaine that receive same
amount of punishment).
5
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lines.29 In 2002, the Sentencing Commission went even further and stated
that the disparity between crack cocaine and cocaine powder "fails to meet
the sentencing objectives set forth by Congress in both the Sentencing
Reform Act and the 1986 Act."3 0 The Commission, relying on significant
research, identified the problematic nature of the disparity and suggested
a decrease of the current ratio to at least twenty-to-one.3 1 Finally, in 2007,
29. See COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLIcY 1995, supra note 19, at 4
(recommending that Congress should revisit 100-to-I ratio and penalty structure).
30. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 106 (2002) [hereinafter COCAINE AND FEDERAL SEN-
TENCING POLICY 2002], available at http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/02crack/2002
crackrpt.pdf ("After carefully considering all of the information currently available
... the Commission firmly and unanimously believes that the current federal co-
caine sentencing policy is unjustified and fails to meet the sentencing objectives set
forth by Congress in both the Sentencing Reform Act and the 1986 Act."). Crack
cocaine and cocaine powder are two forms of the same drug. See COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 1995, supra note 19, at 6 (explaining that crack co-
caine and powder cocaine are two forms of same drug). Cocaine is a naturally
occurring substance that is produced by reacting coca paste, derived from leaves of
a coca plant, with hydrochloric acid. See id. (describing process of producing co-
caine powder). Cocaine powder is considered a potent anesthetic and a powerful
stimulant. See id. (explaining effect of cocaine powder). Crack cocaine is made
using cocaine powder in a simple process that includes baking soda, water, and a
stove or microwave. See id. (describing process of making crack cocaine). The
psychotropic and physiological effects of crack cocaine are the same for crack co-
caine and powder cocaine, with the only difference being the way each is adminis-
tered. See id. at 7 (noting that difference between effects of two drugs depends on
way drug administered). Crack cocaine can only be smoked, while powder cocaine
can be snorted, ingested, or injected. See id. The psychotropic effects of a drug
have more intensity the quicker the drug reaches the brain. See id. (explaining
speed that drug reaches brain determines intensity of psychotropic effects). Crack
cocaine allows the maximum psychotropic effects to occur as soon as one minute
after smoking it and the effects can last up to thirty minutes. See id. (describing
time needed for maximum effects of crack cocaine to occur and duration). Co-
caine powder can differ depending on the use: (1) when injected, it can take up to
four or more minutes for the effects to be felt and last for thirty minutes, or (2)
when snorted, cocaine powder can take up to twenty minutes or more for the
effects to materialize, however, the effects can last up to sixty minutes. See id. (not-
ing length of time before effects are felt using both crack cocaine and cocaine
powder and their relative durations). As of the Sentencing Commission's 2002
report to Congress, the addictiveness of the drugs was thought to depend on the
way it was administered. See COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 2002, supra,
at 19 (explaining that addictiveness can depend on way drug is administered).
The Commission stressed that the properties of the two forms of cocaine are not
what makes one inherently more addictive than the other, but rather whether the
user smokes, injects, or snorts the drug. See id. (stating addictiveness is not depen-
dent on properties of drugs but rather dependent on form user administers drug
to themselves).
31. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 568 (listing reasons why Sentencing Commis-
sion felt sentencing disparity was problematic). The main reasons relied upon by
the Commission were: (1) the 100-to-1 ratio "rested on assumptions about 'the
relative harmfulness of the two drugs and the relative prevalence of certain harm-
ful conduct associated with their use and distribution that more recent data no
longer support'"; (2) the results of the 100-to-I ratio have not been consistent with
the goal of punishing major drug traffickers more severely than low-level dealers;
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 5 [2010], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss5/1
after Congress failed to take any action pursuant to their recommenda-
tions, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 706 without for-
mal approval from Congress.3 2
The sentencing reduction the Commission implemented amounted
to a two-level decrease to the base offense level associated with crack co-
caine.3 3 In practice, this reduction resulted in sentences for crack cocaine
that were only two to five times longer than those for powder cocaine, a
disparity more equivalent to the relative dangers of the two drugs.3 4 The
Amendment took effect on November 1, 2007 and was made retroactive
on March 3, 2008.35
and (3) the disparity was resulting in a public lack of confidence in the criminal
justice system because the severity of the punishment was being mainly felt by Afri-
can-Americans. See id. (detailing three reasons Commission relied upon to demon-
strate that current disparity should be remedied). Regarding the harmfulness of
crack cocaine, the Sentencing Commission found that it was associated with a sig-
nificantly lower amount of trafficking-related violence than previously assumed
when the guidelines were created in 1986. See id. (pointing out that Sentencing
Commission noticed that crack cocaine was not involved in as much trafficking-
related violence as previously assumed). Further, the attempt to punish high-level
traffickers proved unsuccessful because such traffickers are able to supply cocaine
to street drug dealers, who then subsequently convert the powder cocaine into
crack cocaine. See id. (explaining why high-level traffickers have not been pun-
ished by Act as intended). Therefore, if the high-level trafficker gets caught with
powder cocaine, he or she could receive a lower punishment than low-level street
pushers because the small scale pusher is the one who converts it to crack cocaine.
See id. (noting that often smaller scale street dealers actually convert the cocaine
powder into crack cocaine). Notably, the vast majority of convicted smaller scale
dealers are African-American-representing eighty-five percent of defendants con-
victed of crack offenses. See id. (providing data trends showing that sizable major-
ity of crack cocaine convictions are against African-Americans). Nevertheless, this
was the third time the Sentencing Commission had suggested to Congress a reduc-
tion was necessary, asking in 1995 for a reduction to 1-to-1, in 1997 suggesting 5-to-
1, and in 2002 suggesting at least a reduction to 20-to-1. See id. at 569 (detailing
previous suggestions made by Sentencing Commission to Congress with respect to
lowering the disparity that exists).
32. See id. (noting that 2007 report was created like previous years but that
Sentencing Commission decided to adopt proposed reduction in guidelines with-
out Congressional approval).
33. See id. (explaining reduction in sentencing guidelines associated with
crack cocaine).
34. See id. (estimating change in disparity between cocaine powder and crack
cocaine guidelines after reduction in base level of offenses by Sentencing Commis-
sion). The Sentencing Commission meant for the Amendment to be a temporary
fix and is still waiting for a more comprehensive solution from Congress. See id.
(emphasizing that reduction in sentencing guidelines by Sentencing Commission
is partial remedy but ultimately will require Congress to pass appropriate
legislation).
35. See HINTON, supra note 2, at 1 (listing dates that Amendment was first
made effective and when it first applied retroactively).
2010] CASEBRIEF 965
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C. Seeing the Same Thing from Different Angles
Since the Sentencing Commission first made the Amendment effec-
tive, a variety of issues have arisen regarding its compatibility with the re-
sentencing statute.3 6 One specific area of contention involves its
application to defendants who are classified as career offenders pursuant
36. See id. at 2 (pointing out that there have been numerous issues surround-
ing Amendment and its enforceability under resentencing statute). In addition to
issues surrounding career offenders and defendants subject to mandatory mini-
mums, there has also been trouble with the Amendment's application to defend-
ants sentenced pursuant to a binding plea agreement. See id. at 5 (explaining that
circuits have disagreed over whether courts can resentence defendants who en-
tered into binding plea agreements). There are two main areas of disagreement:
(1) whether someone sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement can have a sentence
"based on" the guidelines; and (2) whether the court is bound by a plea agreement
prohibiting the agreement's alteration. See id. 5-6 (addressing reasoning courts
have used when determining whether defendants sentenced pursuant to plea
agreement are eligible or ineligible for resentencing). The former issue is derived
from the resentencing statute's requirement that a court cannot modify a term of
imprisonment unless it was "based on" a sentencing range that has been subse-
quently lowered. See United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2009)
(agreeing with three circuits that have already held sentences prescribed in bind-
ing plea agreements are not "based on" subsequently lowered sentencing ranges).
This had led to confusion over whether a sentence issued pursuant to a plea agree-
ment can be "based on" the guidelines rather than the actual plea agreement. See
id. (addressing issue of whether sentence issued pursuant to plea agreement can
be based on guidelines). The majority of circuits have held that a court is not
allowed to alter a binding plea agreement in a resentencing proceeding. See id. at
282 (holding that sentence was based on plea agreement and not sentencing
guidelines); United States v. Scurlark, 560 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 2009) (same);
United States v. Graham, 304 Fed. App'x 686, 688 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); United
States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369, 378-79 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); United States v.
Trujeque, 100 F.3d 869, 871 (10th Cir. 1996) (same). Nevertheless, the Fourth
Circuit has disagreed, holding that even if a defendant is sentenced pursuant to a
plea agreement, if it is clear the plea agreement was "based on" the guidelines, the
defendant is eligible to seek a reduction under the sentencing statute. See United
States v. Dews, 551 F.3d 204, 208-10 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that where it is clear
that guidelines played central role in sentencing defendant, that defendant can be
eligible for resentencing pursuant to resentencing statute). In circuits that have
not addressed the issue, the majority trend in the district courts has been that plea
agreements are binding for the purposes of resentencing proceedings. See, e.g.,
United States v. Johnson, No. 05-40107-01-RDR, 2008 WL 4758581, at *1 (D. Kan.
Oct. 27, 2008) (holding plea agreements are binding for purposes of resentencing
proceedings); United States v. Bride, No. CRO4-5350 RBL, 2008 WL 2782688, at *1
(W.D. Wash. July 14, 2008) (same); United States v. Tindall, No. 3:04cr00031-2,
2008 WL 2518546, at *1 (W.D. Va. June 19, 2008) (same); United States v. Arroyo,
No. 97 CR1146 (ILG), 2008 WL 2497430, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008) (same);
United States v. Grigsby, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1066 (D. Colo. 2008) (same);
United States v. Clayborn, No. 1:CR-05-51-01, 2008 WL 2229531, at *1 n.2 (M.D.
Pa. May 28, 2008) (same); United States v. Gordon, No. CR-97-24-FHS, 2008 WL
901911, at *1 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2008) (same); see also United States v. Bundy,
613 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37-38 (D. D.C. May 8, 2009) (disagreeing with Dews and hold-
ing that "a sentence agreed to in a Rule 11(c) (1) (C) agreement is not a sentence
'based on a sentencing range' that has been set by the Sentencing Commission").
8
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to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. 3 7 When a defendant has been sentenced within the
career offender guideline range and not granted a downward departure,
courts have uniformly held that the defendant is not eligible for resentenc-
ing.3 8 Courts reason that they lack the authority to grant reductions pur-
suant to the resentencing statute because the Amendment does not
reduce the career offender guidelines that apply to the defendant. 39
On the other hand, defendants who qualify for the career offender
guidelines but receive departures from them have proved more successful
in seeking reduced sentences. 40 A career offender can receive a down-
ward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b) when the judge concludes that
the career offender guidelines over-represent the seriousness of the defen-
dant's criminal history.4 1 Again, the issue courts have struggled with is the
resentencing statute's requirement that the defendant be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment "based on a sentencing range that has subsequently
37. See HINTON, supra note 2, at 7 (addressing issue of whether defendants
sentenced pursuant to career offender guideline ranges are eligible for sentence
reductions). The guidelines describe a defendant as a career offender if:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defen-
dant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense
of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (defining career offender).
38. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 553 F.3d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing career offenders not eligible for reduced sentences when they do not receive
downward departures of any kind); United States v. Forman, 553 F.3d 585 (7th Cir.
2009) (same); United States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d 1236, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008)
(same); United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008) (same);
United States v. Thompson, 290 F. App'x 519, 520 (3d Cir. 2008) (same); United
States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Tyler,
Fed. Appx. 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 889, 890
(8th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Jackson, CA No. 03-793, 2009 WL 101849
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2009) (same); United States v. Perdue, No. 1:99-cr-00334, 2008
WL 4404278, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept 23, 2008) (same); see also HINTON supra note 2,
at 7 (explaining consensus among courts that defendants sentenced pursuant to
career offender guideline ranges are not eligible for resentencing).
39. See HINTON, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining courts have not been willing to
resentence defendants sentenced pursuant to career offender guideline ranges
under resentencing statute because career offender guidelines were not reduced).
40. See id. (stating relief has been granted to defendants who received depar-
tures from career offender guideline ranges).
41. See id. (identifying one departure that career offenders can receive that
has resulted in courts granting sentence reductions under resentencing statute).
The U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 states that "if reliable informa-
tion indicates that the defendant's criminal history category substantially over-rep-
resents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that
the defendant will commit other crimes, a downward departure may be war-
ranted." See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 (explaining appropriate
conditions for judges to grant downward departures because of career offender
classification over-representing defendant's criminal history).
2010] CASEBRIEF 967
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been lowered by the Sentencing Commission."4 2 When trying to deter-
mine whether a sentence is "based on a sentencing range," courts have
used a variety of tests, including: whether the defendant was sentenced
"pursuant" to the subsequently lowered sentencing range; if the district
court relied upon the sentencing range when sentencing the defendant;
whether the range "played a role" in the guideline calculation; and
whether the defendant's sentence was "influenced by and based in part
on" a subsequently lowered sentencing range."3 Nevertheless, when a ca-
reer offender has been granted a departure pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.3(b), the majority of courts have held that the defendant is eligible
for a sentence reduction." Courts have reached this conclusion by deter-
mining that their sentences were "based on" a sentencing range that has
been subsequently lowered because the final sentences were ultimately
based on and influenced by the crack cocaine guidelines.45
Career offenders, however, have not seen as much success when they
receive downward departures for providing substantial assistance to the
government.46 The main hurdle these offenders face is that the sentenc-
42. See HINTON, supra note 2, at 7 (addressing resentencing statute's require-
ment that defendant be sentenced pursuant to term of imprisonment based on
sentencing range subsequently lowered by Sentencing Commission).
43. See United States v. Mullanix, 99 F.3d 323, 324 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that
sentences are based on sentencing ranges if defendant was sentenced pursuant to
subsequently lowered sentencing range); see also Moore, 541 F.3d at 1330 (conclud-
ing there was no basis to determine district court relied upon sentencing range
when determining defendant's sentence); United States v. Herron, No. 3:93crl67-
02-MU, 2008 WL 2986804, at *1 (W.D.N.C. July 31, 2008) (determining whether
sentence imposed was influenced by or based in part on subsequently lowered
sentence range); United States v. Poindexter, 550 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581 (E.D. Pa.
2008) (analyzing whether recommended range played role in guide calculation);
HINTON, supra note 2, at 7 (describing means used by courts to determine whether
defendants' sentences were based on subsequently lowered guideline ranges).
44. See United States v. McGee, 553 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
career offenders may be eligible for reduced sentences when they were granted
downward departures because career offender classification over-represented their
criminal history); Moore, 541 F.3d at 1329-30 (same); United States v. Willis, No. CR
02-120-RE, 2008 WL 4793688 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2008) (same); United States v. Col-
lier, No. 4:05-CR-313 CAS, 2008 WL 4204976, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 5, 2008)
(same); United States v. Ragland, 568 F. Supp. 2d 19, 20 (D. D.C. 2008) (same);
United States v. Clark, Crim. No. 00-037, 2008 WL 2705215, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 7,
2008) (same); United States v. Cornish, Crim. No. 05-337 (SRC), 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50577, at *7-8 (D. N.J. June 25, 2008) (same); Poindexter, 550 F. Supp. 2d at
580-81 (same); United States v. Nigatu, Crim. No. 00-18 (PAM) 2008 WL 926561
(D. Minn. Apr. 7, 2008) (same); cf United States v. Boyd, 2008 WL 2537139, at *3
(W.D. Pa. June 24, 2008) (suggesting reduction would be warranted if § 4A1.3 de-
parture to § 2D1.1 range had been granted).
45. See McGee, 553 F.3d at 227 (concluding defendant was sentenced based on
subsequently lowered guideline range because it was apparent district court pre-
mised sentence on crack cocaine guidelines).
46. See United States v. Williams, 551 F.3d 182, 186-87 (2d Cir. 2009) (explain-
ing that defendants who receive downward departures from career offender guide-
lines are not eligible for resentencing reductions because courts are not allowed to
consider original crack cocaine guidelines when awarding downward departures
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ing jurisprudence in most circuits does not allow judges to consider the
original crack cocaine guidelines when granting such downward depar-
tures.47 Instead, when granting this type of departure, the majority of cir-
cuits only allow the judge to consider factors related to the defendant's
substantial assistance to the government.4 8 This restriction has prevented
defendants from being able to show that their sentences were "based on"
the crack cocaine guidelines in any way, putting them in the same category
as career offenders who receive no downward departure at all.4 9
Moreover, another class of defendants who have experienced difficul-
ties seeking reduced sentences are defendants who are subject to
mandatory minimum sentences but received downward departures for
providing substantial assistance to the government.5 0 A defendant can be
subject to a mandatory minimum sentence because of previous convic-
tions.51 A court is required to apply the mandatory minimum sentence if
it is greater than the maximum applicable sentence from the defendant's
applicable crack cocaine offenses.5 2 The government can file a motion to
depart from a mandatory minimum sentence if a defendant has provided
the government with substantial assistance, just as they do with career of-
for career offenders); Moore, 541 F.3d at 1330 (stating district court provided no
indication that defendant's sentence was based on crack cocaine guidelines rather
than career offender guidelines).
47. See Williams, 551 F.3d at 186-87 (explaining courts are not allowed to con-
sider original crack cocaine guidelines when granting departures from career of-
fender guidelines).
48. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 315 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009) (Fuentes, J.,
concurring) (explaining that all other circuits that have addressed issue concluded
that maximum extent of substantial assistance departure may be based only on
defendant's substantial assistance).
49. See HINTON, supra note 2, at 8 (explaining reason courts have felt differ-
ently about granting sentence reductions for career offenders who received down-
ward departures for substantial assistance). In most circuits, this restriction
characterizes the difference between the two departures and explains why courts
have been reluctant to grant departures when the defendants cannot show that
their sentence was ultimately based on the original crack cocaine guidelines. See
id. at 9 (explaining that difference between two downward departures is judge's
ability to base defendant's ultimate sentence on original crack cocaine guidelines
rather than career offender guidelines).
50. See id. (stating circuits have reached different conclusions regarding eligi-
bility of defendants subject to statutory mandatory minimums to receive downward
departures due to substantial assistance).
51. See Williams, 551 F.3d at 183-84 (explaining defendant was subject to
mandatory minimum sentence because of previous drug conviction).
52. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES IANUA.. § 5G1.1(b) (2007) (detailing
process courts should use when there are conflicting guideline ranges). USSG
§ 5G1.1(b) specifically states that "where a statutorily required minimum sentence
is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily re-
quired minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence." See id. (explaining
procedure when statutory mandatory minimum conflicts with applicable guideline
range).
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fenders.5 3 Additionally, courts are allowed to grant downward departures
below the crack cocaine guideline range after considering a list of fac-
tors.54 While the list itself states it is not exhaustive, the majority of cir-
cuits have held that a judge can base the amount of the court's departure
only on the defendant's substantial assistance.55 Conversely, the Third
Circuit allows judges to consider the seriousness of a defendant's offense
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006) (authorizing courts to depart from
mandatory minimum sentences for substantial assistance provided by defendant to
government). The statute states:
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to
impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sen-
tence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investiga-
tion or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.
Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines and
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to sec-
tion 994 of title 28, United States Code.
Id.
54. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2009) (providing au-
thorization for judges to grant departures from regular guidelines when defend-
ants provide substantial assistance). The Manual states:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another per-
son who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the
guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for rea-
sons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the
following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defen-
dant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation
of the assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or
testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant
or his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
Id. (explaining procedure for granting substantial assistance).
55. See United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1156 (1st Cir. 1993) ("As a
basis for departing, a court may consider mitigating factors only to the extent that
they can fairly be said to touch upon the degree, efficacy, timeliness, and circum-
stances of a defendant's cooperation."); see also United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d
1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) ("While the sentencing court had discretion under§ 5K1.1 in deciding whether to depart from the guidelines and the extent of that
departure, it did not have the discretion to consider factors unrelated to the na-
ture and type of [the defendant's] assistance."); United States v. Bullard, 390 F.3d
413, 416 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing court's limited authority for downward sen-
tencing departure); United States v. Auld, 321 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 2003)(same); United States v. Pearce, 191 F.3d 488, 492 (4th Cir. 1999) (same); United
States v. Campbell, 995 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); see also United States
v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 732, 737 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[A] downward departure from the
statutory minimum sentence for any purpose other than that provided in U.S.S.G.§ 5K1.1 would conflict with and therefore violate the statute [Section 3553(e)].").
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and, therefore, the original guidelines, when determining the extent of its
substantial assistance.56
Nevertheless, the circuit courts remain divided on the question of
whether to allow a sentence reduction in these circumstances.5 7 The Sec-
ond Circuit's line of cases in this area addresses the key problems with
downward departures, the differences between career offender and
mandatory minimum classifications, beginning with United States v. Wil-
liams.58 In Williams, the defendant's crack cocaine offenses subjected him
to a sentencing range of 97 to 127 months; however, due to his previous
criminal history there was a mandatory minimum sentence of 240
months.59 Upon the government's motion, the district court sentenced
the defendant to a 100 month imprisonment, only half of which was asso-
ciated with the crack cocaine offenses.60 After the district court denied
the defendant's motion for resentencing, the Second Circuit affirmed;
however, the court clarified its reasoning, explaining "[t]here [was] no
evidence that the Guidelines range calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)
played any role in the district court's determination of his sentence, and
the district court so found."6 1 This statement left open the possibility for
future defendants to show that the judge considered the crack cocaine
guidelines when granting the substantial assistance departure. 62
Later, in United States v. McGee,63 the Second Circuit held that when a
district court departs from the career offender guidelines and bases that
departure on the crack cocaine guidelines, the defendant should be per-
56. See United States v. Carey, 382 F.3d 387, 391 (3d Cir. 2004) ("On occasion,
and despite the terms of a government recommendation, factors other than those
listed in 5K1.1 have been considered in deciding the extent of a departure.");
United States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 431 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding no error in law
where court took into consideration seriousness of offense when determining ex-
tent of departure).
57. See HINTON, supra note 2, at 9 (stating courts have reached different con-
clusions in determining whether to allow reductions).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 551 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2009) (sug-
gesting for first time in Second Circuit that it would be possible to grant reduction
in these situations).
59. See id. at 183-84 (detailing differences between crack cocaine guidelines
and mandatory minimum guidelines that applied to defendant). In addition, the
defendant was also subject to a sixty-month sentence due to a firearms charge. See
id. at 184 (explaining additional charge against defendant).
60. See id. (detailing sentence district court gave defendant after government
made motion for reduction based on substantial assistance). Fifty months of the
sentence was for the crack cocaine offenses and the other half was for the firearms
charges against the defendant. See id. (explaining sentence).
61. See id. (emphasizing that there was no evidence of any consideration of
original guidelines range when determining defendant's sentence).
62. See United States v. McGee, 553 F.3d 225, 228-29 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Thus,
we allowed that a defendant whose post-departure sentence was in fact determined
by the crack cocaine guidelines might be eligible for a reduced sentence.").
63. 553 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2009).
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mitted to seek resentencing.6 4 In McGee, the defendant was originally des-
ignated as a career offender, but the district court ultimately based its
sentence on the crack cocaine guidelines because the judge concluded
that the "career offender classification overrepresented his criminal his-
tory."6 5 The court pointed out, however, that the same reasoning may not
apply to defendants who were subject to a mandatory minimum and re-
ceived downward departures. 6 6 The critical difference was that downward
departures granted to defendants with mandatory minimum sentences
can only be "based on" the defendants' substantial assistance to the
government.67
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit also recently addressed whether resen-
tencing should be permitted for defendants who were granted substantial
assistance departures from mandatory minimums in United States v. Hood.6 8
In Hood, the court considered two appeals from a district court that denied
both defendants' motions for resentencing. 69 The defendants were guilty
of trafficking crack cocaine and were subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence of 240 months. 70 The district court reduced the sentences of
both defendants for substantial assistance provided to the government,
lowering the sentences to 100 and 108 months, respectively. 7 ' The Fourth
Circuit ultimately denied the defendants' motions and based its reasoning
on the fact that: (1) a district court is not authorized to consider the origi-
nal crack cocaine guidelines when granting the downward departure if the
defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum; and (2) granting a defen-
dant a substantial assistance departure is still based on the mandatory min-
64. See id. at 230 (concluding that defendants who fell under career offender
guidelines but received sentences ultimately based on crack cocaine guidelines
were eligible for resentencing).
65. See id. at 226 (noting court departed from defendant's career offender
classification to sentence him based on applicable crack cocaine guidelines). Thejudge used the actual crack cocaine guidelines at the time (prior to the amend-
ments) to calculate the defendant's sentence. See id. (detailing how district courtjudge determined defendant's sentence). The defendant's previous sentencing
range was between ninety-two to one hundred and fifteen months imprisonment,
but after the guideline amendments his new sentencing range would be seventy-
seven to ninety-six months. See id. (noting difference between defendant's previ-
ous sentencing range and new sentencing range after amendments).
66. See id. at 228 n.2 (explaining that departures granted to career offenders
presents somewhat different scenario).
67. See id. (stating difference between two is that defendants who are labeled
career offenders can receive downward departures based on crack cocaine guide-
lines, while defendants subject to mandatory minimums cannot).
68. 556 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2009) (considering motion for resentencing by
defendant who received substantial assistance departure from mandatory
minimum).
69. See id. at 228 (explaining procedural posture).
70. See id. (stating defendants were both subject to mandatory minimum
sentences of 240 months due to crack cocaine violations).
71. See id. (noting court's award of downward departure to both defendants
for providing substantial assistance to government).
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imum guidelines, which do not create a new applicable guideline. 72
Again, like other circuits, the Fourth Circuit determined that district
courts are unable to base downward departures on the crack cocaine
guidelines lowered by the Amendment.73
While the circuit courts have had a difficult time applying the Amend-
ment to the various classifications of defendants, a report created by Sen-
tencing Commission staff prior to the enactment of the Amendment helps
provide some indication of who the intended beneficiaries are.7 4 For in-
72. See id. at 237 ("No guideline range was applicable, and Amendment 706
did not purport to reduce any factors that the district court was authorized to
consider in quantifying a downward departure under § 3553(e).").
73. See id. at 234 n.2 ("Moreover, the weight of authority in other circuits
undercuts Hood's contention; in short, the extent of a § 3553(e) departure is
based solely on the defendant's substantial assistance and other factors related to
that assistance."). The court also explained that the Fourth Circuit previously held
that downward departures from mandatory minimum sentences qualify as "depar-
tures from, not the removal of" a mandatory minimum sentence. See id. at 235
(explaining court's previous conclusion that departures from mandatory mini-
mums are nothing more than departures and do not remove mandatory minimum
completely). The same reasoning was used by the Eleventh Circuit in United States
v. Williams. See 549 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating there is no indication
that statute permitting downward departure intends to eliminate statutory
mandatory minimum). In Williams, the defendant pled guilty to distribution of
more than five grams of crack cocaine, which would have resulted in a sentence of
ninety-two to 115 months on its own. See id. at 1338 (explaining charge to which
defendant pled guilty and corresponding crack cocaine sentencing guidelines).
Nevertheless, due to two prior felony convictions the defendant was subject to a
mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months. See id. (stating that defendant's
previous felony convictions subjected him to mandatory minimum sentence). Re-
gardless, due to the defendant's substantial assistance, he too was granted a down-
ward departure and ultimately received a sentence of sixty months plus eight years
of probation. See id. (describing ultimate sentence defendant received after court
took into consideration defendant's substantial assistance to government). In ad-
dition, the district court informed the defendant and the government that it was
considering lowering the defendant's sentence to fifty months because Amend-
ment 706 reduced the crack cocaine base levels. See id. (noting court's considera-
tion of Amendment and its potential impact on case). Nevertheless, the Eleventh
Circuit denied the defendant's motion for resentencing, holding that the defen-
dant's sentence was not based on the crack cocaine guidelines, but rather was
based on the mandatory minimum and, therefore, was ineligible for resentencing.
See id. at 1342 (explaining that because defendant was subject to mandatory mini-
mum that replaced original crack cocaine guidelines he was ineligible for resen-
tencing). The Eleventh Circuit focused its reasoning on the fact that the statute
authorizing downward departures from mandatory minimum sentences does not
indicate that granting a departure removes the mandatory minimum from being
the applicable guideline range. See id. at 1341 (explaining court did not believe
granting downward departures in these situations dispensed of or waived
mandatory minimum).
74. See Schmitt, supra note 4, at 5 (indicating types of cases that would be
eligible for retroactive application of crack cocaine amendments). The report in-
dicated that the cases would need to fit into the following criteria:
(A) crack cocaine was involved in the offense;
(B) the base offense level was greater than level 12;
(C) the base offense level was not level 43;
9732010]
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stance, in the Commission's prediction of the expected percentage of de-
fendants who would be affected by the Amendment's enactment, it listed
the types of defendants who would be eligible for resentencing.75 The
report indicated that defendants who received downward departures from
mandatory minimums for substantial assistance would be eligible, even if
the departure was based on a Rule 35 motion after the date of the original
sentencing.76 Although circuit courts are not bound by the report, it does
provide a good reference for courts trying to determine the Sentencing
Commission's intent in promulgating the amendments.7 7 Not surpris-
ingly, the report has been referenced by circuit courts attempting to deter-
mine the application of the Amendment.78
(D) the quantity of crack cocaine involved in the offense was less than
4,500 grams;
(F) the offender's final offense level was not derived from the career of-
fender or armed career offender guideline;
(G) the offender's original sentence was greater than any applicable stat-
utory mandatory minimum punishment, unless the offender received re-
lief from the mandatory minimum punishment pursuant to the statutory
safety valve of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (incorporated into the guidelines at§ 5C1.2) or the offender received a departure under § 5K1.1 for substan-
tial assistance when originally sentenced.
Id. at 5-6 (listing criteria for cases considered eligible for consideration of retroac-
tive application of 2007 crack cocaine amendments).
75. See id. at 5 (listing eligible defendants included in Commission staff's anal-
ysis of potentially affected defendants if Amendment was enacted).
76. See id. 6-7 n.20 (differentiating defendants who did not receive downward
departures as ineligible and ones that did as eligible if amendments were passed).
The report specifically mentioned the Rule 35 motion defendants to point out that
the report did not include them in the number of possibly affected prisoners be-
cause the Commission did not have data on offenders who receive downward de-
partures after the date of their original sentence. See id. (explaining that
additional group of prisoners will be affected but that they are not reflected in
numbers because Commission's data did not include information as to who re-
ceives downward assistance after original sentencing).
77. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2009) (Fuentes, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging report could be good indication of what Sentencing
Commission intended by passing crack cocaine amendments).
78. See United States v. Williams, 549 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2008) (ac-
knowledging that Sentencing Commission report indicated that defendants sub-ject to mandatory minimums who received substantial assistance would be eligible
for resentencing); see also Doe, 564 F.3d at 318 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (noting
uncertainty as to weight of authority that report should be given, but acknowledg-
ing that it raises question about how Sentencing Commission intended amend-
ments to be applied).
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III. UNITED STATES v. DOE: ANOTHER ANGLE
A. Factual Background of Doe
The appellants in Doe,7 9 John and Jane Doe, both pled guilty to
charges of conspiracy to distribute and distribution of crack cocaine.8 0
Additionally, they entered into plea agreements with the government.8 1
John Doe's total adjusted offense level, which determines the sentencing
range of the defendant when combined with the defendant's criminal his-
tory, was a thirty-three, and his criminal history category was two. 82 Based
on these levels, the crack cocaine offenses subjected him to a sentencing
range of 151 to 188 months of imprisonment; however, because of a previ-
ous drug conviction, John Doe was also subject to a mandatory minimum
of life in prison.8 3 Because the mandatory minimum was greater than the
applicable crack cocaine guidelines, the district court imposed the
mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1. 84 Despite
this ruling, the government made a motion for a downward departure due
to the substantial assistance the defendant provided to the government.8 5
The district court ultimately sentenced the defendant to eighty-four
months imprisonment, lower than the mandatory minimum and the origi-
nal crack cocaine guidelines.8 6
Jane Doe's sentencing followed a similar path, commencing with a
total adjusted offense level of thirty-four and a criminal history of category
two.8 7 These figures combined to result in a sentencing range of 121 to
79. 564 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2009).
80. See id. at 307 (identifying defendants and charges to which they pled
guilty). Each defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute crack
cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846) and one count of distribution of crack cocaine (21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)). See id. (describing charges at issue).
81. See id. (noting both defendants entered into plea agreements with
government).
82. See id. (describing John Doe's total adjusted offense level and criminal
history category).
83. See id. at 308 (noting John Doe was subject to mandatory minimum be-
cause of previous drug conviction).
84. See id. (pointing out that district court was required to use mandatory min-
imum as guideline sentence because it exceeded the crack cocaine guidelines pur-
suant to U.S.S.G. § 51I).
85. See id. (explaining government moved for downward departure from
mandatory minimum because of substantial assistance defendant provided to
government).
86. See id. (acknowledging district court's ultimate sentence was below both
guideline ranges that could have applied to defendant). The downward departure
from the mandatory minimum was granted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and
the departure from the crack cocaine guidelines pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. See
id. (pointing out statutory authority used by district court to depart from both
guideline ranges).
87. See id. (acknowledging Jane Doe's total adjusted offense level and her
criminal history category of two). While her base offense level was a thirty-four,
she received a three-level reduction for accepting responsibility. See id. (explaining
elements ofJane Doe's total adjusted offense level).
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151 months imprisonment based on the crack cocaine guidelines.8 8 Nev-
ertheless, like John Doe, she was subject to a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of twenty years due to a prior drug conviction.8 9 Once again, the
mandatory minimum became the guidelines sentence; however, Jane Doe
also provided substantial assistance and, after a motion by the government
to such effect, the district court granted her a downward departure.90 In
the end, Jane Doe was sentenced to forty-one months imprisonment, sig-
nificantly below both the mandatory minimum sentence and the original
crack cocaine guidelines.9 1 After the Sentencing Commission enacted
Amendment 706 and made it retroactive, both defendants filed motions
for reductions in their sentences.9 2 The district court denied both mo-
tions because it believed that granting a reduction would not be consistent
with the policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission.9 3
B. Filling the Cracks: The Third Circuit Denies Both Motions
The Third Circuit's decision in Doe is significant because it signals the
possible end to crack cocaine litigation for any career offenders or defend-
ants subject to mandatory minimum sentences. 94 In Doe, the court held
that the Sentencing Commission's policy statement issued in conjunction
with the resentencing statute effectively bars courts from reducing defend-
ants' sentences when they were subject to a mandatory minimum sen-
88. See id. (noting applicable guideline range based on crack cocaine
guidelines).
89. See id. (explaining thatJane Doe's previous drug conviction subjected her
to mandatory minimum sentence).
90. See id. (pointing out that Jane Doe was also subject to mandatory mini-
mum sentence for previous drug conviction but received downward departure be-
cause of substantial assistance provided to government). Again, the government
moved for a downward departure from the mandatory minimum pursuant to Sec-
tion 3553(e) and from the original crack cocaine guidelines pursuant to U.S.S.G.§ 5K1.1. See id. (listing statutory authority for granting departures from mandatory
minimum and original crack cocaine guidelines).
91. See id. (acknowledging Jane Doe's ultimate sentence was significantly be-
low both mandatory minimum sentence and original crack cocaine guidelines).
92. See id. (explaining that both defendants made motions for reduced
sentences after Sentencing Commission passed Amendment 706 and made it
retroactive).
93. See id. (noting district court denied both motions because granting sen-
tence reductions would not have been consistent with Sentencing Commission's
policy statement).
94. See Sarah Gannett, Has the Third Circuit Ended Crack Litigation?, THIRD CIR-
curr BLOc (May 1, 2009), http://circuit3.blogspot.com/2009_05_01_archive.html
(pointing out possibility that Third Circuit ended crack litigation for resentencing
for any career offender or defendant subject to mandatory minimum that received
downward departures).
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tence, even if they received a downward departure.9 5 The majority
opinion methodically rejected six arguments raised by the defendants.96
The Third Circuit started its analysis by identifying the two prongs a
defendant must satisfy to be eligible for a sentence reduction under the
resentencing statute.9 7 They are: (1) "the defendant must have been 'sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission'"; and (2) the
reduction must be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission."98 The majority focused on the second
prong-specifically, the policy statement that requires an amendment to
"have the effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guideline range."9 9
The court believed that the case could be decided solely on this prong-
because both must be satisfied-and, therefore, did not feel compelled to
extensively address the defendants' arguments addressing the first
prong.100 Instead, this conclusion allowed the court to ignore the defend-
ants' theory that their downward departures for substantial assistance were
partially "based on" the now-amended crack cocaine guidelines, and
which would have addressed the first prong of the test.10 1
The court also rejected the theory that requiring a defendant to sat-
isfy the policy statement had the effect of redefining the term "based on"
used in the first prong.102 Specifically, the court used the plain language
of the statute to reject the suggestion that the Sentencing Commission did
95. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 315 (stating that policy statement issued by Sentencing
Commission creates jurisdictional bar to sentence modification when defendant
was subject to mandatory minimum sentence).
96. See id. (addressing and rejecting six arguments presented by defendant).
97. See id. at 309 (pointing out defendants must satisfy two elements of resen-
tencing statute to qualify for sentence reductions).
98. See id. (listing two elements of resentencing statute that need to be satis-
fied for defendant to be eligible for sentencing reduction).
99. See id. (noting that policy statement issued in conjunction with resentenc-
ing statute requires amendments to have lowered defendant's applicable guideline
range).
100. See id. at 310 (stating that case could be decided based on second
element).
101. See id. (rejecting defendants' first argument).
102. See id. (rejecting theory that requiring second element to be satisfied
redefines "based on" from first element). Specifically, the defendant argued that
requiring the Amendment to have the effect of lowering the mandatory minimum
sentence foreclosed the possibility that "based on" could have other meanings
than just the mandatory minimum sentence. See id. (explaining defendant's the-
ory that requiring Amendment to have specific effect of lowering mandatory mini-
mum sentence redefines "based on"). The defendant argued that the statutes
must be read with their ordinary meaning in mind and that "basis" can mean "a
supporting layer or part." See id. (explaining defendant's interpretation of stat-
ute). This, according to the defendant, would suggest that the resentencing stat-
ute does not require that the sentencing range lowered by the Amendment be the
sole or primary basis for the ultimate sentence. See id. (explaining defendant's
argument regarding implications and requirements of sentencing statute).
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not intend the second prong to be a requirement of eligibility. 0 3 The
resentencing statute states that any sentence reduction must be "consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,"
which the court determined not only incorporates the two elements, but
also makes them complementary.10 4
Next, using language from the guidelines and Third Circuit prece-
dent, the court rejected the defendants' argument that the Amendment
only needs to lower the defendants' initial guideline range. 0 5 The court's
reasoning focused on language from the Sentencing Commission's Sen-
tencing Manual, which instructs judges on how to calculate a defendant's
sentence.10 6 The last step of the instructions calculates the mandatory
minimum, which the court determined indicated that the mandatory min-
imum would be the "applicable guideline range" referred to in the policy
statement.10 7 In addition, the court also supported its reasoning with lan-
guage from U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), which states "[w]here a statutorily re-
quired minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable
guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the
guideline sentence." 0 8 To complement the manual, the court also cited
the Third Circuit's previous decision in Cordero, which held that
mandatory minimum sentences "subsume and displace" the original
guideline ranges and become the starting point for any downward depar-
ture the court may grant a defendant.' 0 9 Though the issue in Cordero fo-
cused on determining the starting point for applying downward
103. See id. (noting that statute also requires policy statement be applied
under plain language of statute).
104. See id. (suggesting Congress not only intended to incorporate elements
but also wanted them to be complementary). The court acknowledged that the
policy statement is definitely a narrower statement, but that it does not contradict
the resentencing statute. See id. at 311 (pointing out that policy statement does not
contradict resentencing statute).
105. See id. (rejecting defendant's argument that Amendment need only to
lower initial guideline range by employing language from guidelines and Third
Circuit precedent).
106. See id. (looking to Commission's general instructions on how to apply
guidelines).
107. See id. ("Therefore, as the District Court held, the calculation of the stat-
utory mandatory minimum under § 5G1.1(b), not that of the initial Guideline
range under § 5A, was the final step in determining the Appellants' applicable
Guideline ranges.").
108. See id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1 (b)).
109. See id. (citing United States v. Cordero, 313 F.3d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 2002))
(stating that mandatory minimum sentence is not waived when defendant receives
downward departure). In Cordero, the defendant was subject to a mandatory mini-
mum sentence and was granted a downward departure. See id. (citing Cordero, 313
F.3d at 162) (providing facts of Cordero case). The defendant attempted to appeal
and argue that the downward departure should have been applied to the initial
guidelines rather than the mandatory minimum sentence; however, the Third Cir-
cuit concluded that courts are required to calculate the departure using the
mandatory minimum sentence as the starting point. See id. (citing Cordero, 313
F.3d at 166) (explaining holding of case).
978 [Vol. 55: p. 959
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 5 [2010], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss5/1
departures, not resentencing proceedings, the court applied the same rea-
soning and required that the term "applicable guideline range" refer to
the mandatory minimum sentence that subsumes the initial guidelines. 1 0
The next issue addressed by the court was whether, after United States
v. Booker,"' the Sentencing Commission's policy statement could be con-
sidered simply advisory for a court in a resentencing proceeding.1 12 This
argument was rejected because of previous Third Circuit precedent stating
that Booker did not apply to proceedings under the resentencing statute
that can only have the effect of lowering a defendant's sentence rather
than increasing it."i 3 The court previously held that Booker only "ap-
plie [d] to full sentencing hearings-whether in an initial sentencing or in
a resentencing where the original sentence is vacated for error."11 4 The
court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit's holding that the guidelines were
advisory in all contexts 1 5 but ultimately chose to adopt the reasoning of
the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, which all rejected the Ninth Cir-
cuit's approach."i 6
The court then addressed the defendants' argument that its reason-
ing compels "patently absurd and unfair results."1 7 For example, a defen-
dant could be subject to a mandatory minimum but have high offense
levels that result in the initial crack cocaine guidelines being above the
110. See id. (acknowledging that cases address different issues but concluding
same reasoning applies).
111. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
112. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 312 (addressing defendant's argument that policy
statement is not mandatory or binding on court after Booker).
113. See id. at 313 (stating Bookerdoes not apply to such resentencing proceed-
ings because they lower defendants' sentences rather than increasing them). In
Booker, the Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the Sixth Amendment for
ajudge to give a defendant an enhanced sentence based on the judge's determina-
tion of a fact that the defendant did not admit or that was not found by the jury.
See id. (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 244) (pointing out Supreme Court's holding in
Booker). Because the Supreme Court's holding was incompatible with the
mandatory sentences promulgated by the Sentencing Commission it severed the
provision in the sentencing guidelines that made them mandatory. See id. (citing
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245) (explaining reasoning of Supreme Court for severing
mandatory provision of sentencing guidelines).
114. See id. at 313 (stating Third Circuit has previously held that provisions
are not advisory during resentencing proceedings). The court went on to point
out that Booker was intended to apply to sentencing hearings that enhanced the
defendant's sentence, not to proceedings that lowered it. See id. (explaining that
proceedings that lowered defendants' sentences were not intended to be affected).
In addition, the court noted that the resentencing proceedings were not men-
tioned in the Booker decision as further indication that the Supreme Court did not
intend for its holding to apply to those types of proceedings. See id. (indicating
that Supreme Court did not mention resentencing proceedings in its opinion).
115. See United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that sentencing guidelines were advisory in all contexts).
116. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 314 (noting that majority of courts have disagreed
with Ninth Circuit's holding).
117. See id. (addressing defendants' fifth argument that court's reasoning pro-
duces were absurd and rendered unfair results).
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mandatory minimum sentence and the mandatory minimum not being
applied.1 18 Such a defendant would be eligible to seek a reduction of his
or her sentence while defendants with offense levels below the mandatory
minimum would not.119 Nevertheless, the court was not persuaded by the
potential results and cited Cordero and the statutory language contained in
Section 3582(c) (2) in support of its position.12 0
Finally, the court rejected the defendants' argument that the district
court should not have denied their motion, but rather should have ap-
plied the rule of lenity.121 The court acknowledged that in certain situa-
tions a reasonable doubt exists as to whether the rule should be applied,
but explained it does not need to be applied "simply because a statute
requires consideration and interpretation to confirm its meaning."' 22
Rather, in Doe, the court believed it did not have to resort to the rule of
lenity because the phrases "based on" and "the effect of lowering the de-
fendant's applicable guideline range" could be interpreted using the lan-
guage structure, subject matter, context, and history of the resentencing
statute, and the Sentencing Commission's policy statement. 23
IV. DOE's EFFECT ON THE RESENTENCING OF PREVIOUS
CRACK COCAINE OFFENDERS
The Third Circuit's result in Doe has support in other circuits that
have dealt with similar defendants.124 Nevertheless, how the Third Circuit
came to that result is perhaps the most significant aspect of the decision
that will impact future litigants.125 Most circuits that have reached the
same result have affirmed denials of these motions pursuant to the resen-
118. See id. (detailing defendants' example of situations where unfair results
would occur).
119. See id. (pointing out how defendants with higher offense levels can be
eligible for sentence reductions while defendants with lower offense levels may
not). The defendants also pointed out that they were not permitted to benefit
from the amended guideline range and that their substantial assistance did not
address the injustice that was the propelling force behind the crack cocaine
amendments. See id. (suggesting two other results that occur under court's reason-
ing and that produce unfair treatment).
120. See id. (rejecting defendants' argument regarding unfair results based on
Cordero holding and language contained in resentencing statute).
121. See id. (rejecting defendants' argument that court should have applied
rule of lenity in interpreting statute).
122. See id. at 315 (explaining that rule of lenity does not need to be applied
simply because statute needs further consideration and interpretation).
123. See id. (determining that rule of lenity was not necessary to interpret stat-
ute because of available alternatives helpful in assessing its meaning).
124. See United States v. Hood, 556 F.3d 226, 236-37 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding
that defendant's sentence was based on statutory mandatory minimum and not
based on initial crack cocaine guidelines); United States v. Williams, 549 F.3d
1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating statutory mandatory minimum replaced origi-
nal crack cocaine guidelines and, therefore, could not be based on them).
125. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 318 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (pointing out that ma-
jority opinion does not differentiate these defendants from career offenders who
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tencing statute's first requirement, which dictates that downward depar-
tures from mandatory minimums are "based on" the mandatory
minimum-as opposed to the initial crack cocaine guidelines.12 6 This
conclusion is logical because judges in those circuits are not allowed to
consider the initial crack cocaine guidelines when granting substantial as-
sistance departures from mandatory minimum sentences.12 7 This reason-
ing, however, is harder to follow in the Third Circuit because judges are
actually allowed to consider the seriousness of the defendant's offense and
original crack cocaine guidelines when determining the substantial assis-
tance departure. 128 Presumably this difference forced the Third Circuit to
rely on the Commission's policy statement for their denial-something
the majority of circuits have not done-because the defendants would
have appeared eligible for resentencing if the district court did use the
original crack cocaine guidelines when determining the defendants'
downward departure.129
The Third Circuit held that, for defendants subject to mandatory
minimums, the policy statement bars the court from reducing the sen-
tence regardless of whether the judge grants their departure based on the
amended guidelines.1 3 0 This reasoning could adversely affect career of-
fenders who receive downward departures in the Third Circuit.13 ' In par-
ticular, it could impact career offenders who receive downward departures
due to overstatement of their criminal history in the classification, even
though this group has been relatively successful when seeking reduced
sentences in other circuits.1 32 In both circumstances, the defendant's
judges determine should be granted downward departures, because that classifica-
tion overstates their criminal history).
126. See, e.g., Hood, 556 F.3d at 236-37 (holding that defendant's sentence was
based on statutory mandatory minimum); Williams, 549 F.3d at 1342 (stating statu-
tory mandatory minimum replaced original crack cocaine guidelines).
127. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 315 n.1 ("[A]ll other circuits to have addressed the
issue have held that the maximum extent of a substantial assistance departure may
be based only on the defendant's substantial assistance.").
128. See id. at 315 (acknowledging that Third Circuit allowsjudges to consider
seriousness of defendant's offense when determining extent of substantial assis-
tance departure).
129. See id. at 315-16 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (explaining that plain meaning
of policy statement suggests defendants would be eligible for resentencing because
district court used initial guideline range that was lowered to determine extent of
downward departure).
130. See id. at 310 (majority opinion) (refusing to address defendant's argu-
ment that departure was based on amended crack cocaine guidelines because case
could be decided solely on second element of resentencing statute).
131. See id. at 318 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (pointing out that majority does
not differentiate defendant's circumstances from those of career offenders who
receive downward departures).
132. See United States v. McGee, 553 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that career offenders may be eligible for reduced sentences when they were origi-
nally granted downward departures because career offender classification over-
represented their criminal history); United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1329-30
(11th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Willis, No. CR 02-120-RE, 2008 WL
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mandated sentence is deemed inappropriate and the defendant receives a
downward departure based on the original guidelines.1 33
In the future, these career offenders should focus their argument on
differentiating the procedure of granting downward departures for career
offenders from the departure procedure used for defendants subject to a
mandatory minimum.134 Specifically, a defendant should argue that,
when a judge determines that the career offender classification overstates
the defendant's criminal history, sentencing the defendant within the
original crack cocaine guidelines represents a complete departure from
the career offender classification.1 3 5 Making this distinction in future
Third Circuit cases will be critical for defendants because Doe's holding
rests on the court's conclusion that the mandatory minimum sentence re-
places the original crack cocaine guidelines.' 3 6 If a defendant cannot con-
vince the court that the career offender classification does not subsume
the original crack cocaine guidelines permanently, the defendant's argu-
ment will likely face a similar fate as the defendants' argument in Doe.'3 7
Notably, the court did not address the impact of its holding on career
offenders who receive downward departures because they provided sub-
stantial assistance to the government.'3 8 The circuits that have recently
addressed this issue have generally denied these defendants' resentencing
motions, again relying on judges' inability to consider the original crack
cocaine guidelines when granting downward departures for substantial as-
4793688 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2008) (same); United States v. Ragland, 568 F. Supp. 2d
19, 20 (D. D.C. 2008) (same); United States v. Clark, Crim. No. 00-037, 2008 WL
2705215, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2008) (same); United States v. Cornish, Crim. No.
05-337 (SRC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50577, at *7-8 (D. N.J. June 25, 2008) (same);
United States v. Poindexter, 550 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580-581 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (same);
United States v. Nigatu, Crim. No. 00-18 (PAM), 2008 WL 926561 (D. Minn. Apr.
7, 2008) (same); cf United States v. Boyd, Crim. No. 01-29 Erie, 2008 WL 2537139,
at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 24, 2008) (suggesting reduction would be warranted if§ 4A1.3 departure to § 2D1.1 range had been granted).
133. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 318 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (explaining that both
scenarios present situations where mandated sentences are deemed inappropriate
and recognizing that initial crack cocaine guidelines may play role in determining
proper sentence).
134. See McGee, 553 F.3d at 228 n.2 (stating that departures from career of-
fender guidelines present different scenario than departures from mandatory
minimums).
135. See id. ("Put differently, a departure back down to the initially applicable
crack cocaine guideline range accepts that a defendant does not fall within the
heartland of the career offender guidelines.").
136. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 311 (stating mandatory minimum subsumes original
crack cocaine guidelines and becomes defendant's applicable guideline range).
137. See id. at 312 ("The initial ranges have been subsumed. Accordingly,
Amendment 706 does not have the effect of lowering the Appellants' applicable
Guideline ranges because the mandatory minimums were unaffected by Amend-
ment 706.").
138. See generally id. at 305-18 (failing to address impact decision has on career
offenders who receive downward departures for providing substantial assistance).
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sistance.13 9 Consequently, a defendant should emphasize that Third Cir-
cuit sentencing procedure allows judges to consider the crack cocaine
guidelines when granting downward departures based on substantial assis-
tance. 140 As the judge is allowed to consider the guidelines when deciding
how much of a departure to grant, defendants should attempt to convince
the court that their sentence would have been lower if the amended guide-
lines had been in effect at that time.14 1 There is room for disagreement,
as evidenced by the conflicting results throughout the circuits, but a future
litigant should raise the rule of lenity while also appealing to the underly-
ing purpose of the Amendment. 142 The Amendment was enacted to ad-
dress the "urgent and compelling" problem that plagued the prior 100-to-
1 drug quantity ratio. 143 In addition, the Supreme Court reserves lenity
for situations where a "reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended
scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history,
and motivating policies of the statute."14 4 While the majority may have
rejected this argument in Doe, future litigants need only look to Judge
Fuentes' concurring opinion to see that a reasonable doubt still exists.1 4 5
V. CONcLusION
The full effect of the Third Circuit's holding in Doe remains to be
seen, but surely its ramifications on crack cocaine defendants seeking re-
sentencing are considerable. 146 Additionally, the current impact of the
majority's reasoning allows for unusual results-providing more serious
139. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 551 F.3d 182, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) (ex-
plaining that defendant's substantial assistance departure should not have been
influenced by original crack cocaine guidelines because judge may only consider
substantial assistance provided to government); United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d
1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating defendant's downward departure from career
offender classification because of substantial assistance was different process than
when court granted departure due to overrepresentation of criminal history).
140. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 315 (stating Third Circuit precedent allows district
courts to consider seriousness of defendant's offense when determining extent of
downward departure).
141. See United States v. McGee, 553 F.3d 225, 228 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Since ...
the district court sentenced McGee based on the crack cocaine guidelines and
would likely have considered a different sentence from the one imposed if the
applicable crack guidelines had so provided, we think that a different reading
would lend itself to excessive formalism.").
142. See id. at 229-30 (stressing importance of underlying purpose of Amend-
ment and use of rule of lenity in these situations).
143. See id. at 229 (explaining that Amendment was enacted to address com-
pelling and urgent problem that existed within current drug-quantity ratio).
144. See id. (acknowledging that Supreme Court uses rule of lenity in similar
situations where reasonable doubt still exists after resort to available alternatives).
145. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 318 (Fuentes, J., concurring) ("While its language
barely favors the majority's interpretation, I am unsure whether our reading of the
policy statement truly reflects the intent of its drafters.").
146. See Gannett, supra note 94 (highlighting possibility that Third Circuit en-
ded crack litigation for resentencing of any career offender or defendant subject
to mandatory minimum who received downward departures).
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offenders opportunities to seek reduced sentences while denying defend-
ants with lower offenses that same opportunity.' 7 While the question of
how this holding will apply to career offenders is still open, the majority's
reasoning certainly provides caution for future litigants.' 8 In the future,
courts should be vigilant to avoid allowing excessive formalism to dilute
the Amendment's intent by denying relief to defendants who were disad-
vantaged by the very disparity it sought to correct.149 Hopefully, future
decisions will resolve the conflicting applications that currently exist
among the circuits, and prompt the Sentencing Commission to provide
further clarity so that courts are no longer forced to make educated
guesses.' 5 0
Brian Crowell
147. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 317 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (explaining "absurd"
results from reasoning employed by majority opinion).
148. See id. (noting that court does not differentiate Doe's circumstances from
another similar category that circuits have ruled eligible for resentencing under
policy statement).
149. See CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING REFORM: A MODEST STEP IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION, supra note 1 (explaining why Sentencing Commission decided to re-
duce guideline range).
150. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 318 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (expressing discomfort
with majority's interpretation of policy statement and uncertainty as to whether
court truly reflected intention of Sentencing Commission).
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